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Abstract
We consider two fundamental multi-user channel models: the multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) wiretap channel with one helper (WTH) and the MIMO multiple ac-
cess wiretap channel (MAC-WT). In each case, the eavesdropper has K antennas while
the remaining terminals haveN antennas each. We consider a fast fading channel where
the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate receiver is available at the trans-
mitters but no channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) is available for
the eavesdropper’s channel. We determine the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.) for each channel model for the regime K ≤ N , and show that in this regime,
the MAC-WT channel reduces to the WTH in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT. For
the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we obtain the optimal linear s.d.o.f., and show that the
MAC-WT channel and the WTH have the same optimal s.d.o.f. when restricted to
linear encoding strategies. In the absence of any such restrictions, we provide an upper
bound for the sum s.d.o.f. of the MAC-WT chanel in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . Our
results show that unlike in the single-input single-output (SISO) case, there is loss of
s.d.o.f. for even the WTH due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT when K ≥ N .
1 Introduction
We consider two multi-user models: the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap
channel with one helper (WTH) where the transmitter, the helper and the legitimate re-
ceiver have N antennas each, and the eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 1, and the
MIMO multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT), where both transmitters and the le-
gitimate receiver have N antennas each and the eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 2.
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In both cases, the channel is fast fading and the channel gains vary in an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) fashion across the links and time. We consider the case when
the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is not available at the transmitters (no
eavesdropper CSIT). Our goal in this paper is to investigate the optimal sum secure degrees
of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of the MIMO WTH and the MIMO MAC-WT channel as a function of
N and K.
To that end, we provide an achievable scheme based on vector space alignment [1], that
attains 1
2
(2N − K) s.d.o.f. for the WTH for all values of 0 ≤ K ≤ 2N . Note that when
K ≤ N , this value coincides with the optimal s.d.o.f. for the WTH in the case where full
eavesdropper CSIT is available. Therefore, for the regime K ≤ N , there is no loss of
s.d.o.f. for the WTH due to the lack of eavesdropper CSIT. Further, the proposed scheme
which does not require eavesdropper CSIT, is optimal. The achievable scheme for the WTH
also suffices as an achievable scheme for the MAC-WT channel, since we can treat one of
the transmitters as a helper and use time-sharing among the two transmitters.
To prove the optimality of the proposed scheme for the MAC-WT channel, we next
provide a matching converse for the regime K ≤ N . Besides using MIMO versions of
the secrecy penalty lemma and the role of a helper lemma [2], the converse proof relies
on exploiting channel symmetry at the eavesdropper. Since the transmitters do not have
the eavesdropper’s CSIT, the output at the K antennas of the eavesdropper are entropy
symmetric [3], i.e., any two subsets of the antenna outputs have the same differential entropy,
if the subsets are of equal size. Finally, we use a MIMO version of the least alignment
lemma [4, 5], which states that the differential entropy at the output of the terminal which
does not provide CSIT is the greatest among terminals having equal number of antennas.
Intuitively, this holds since no signal alignment is possible at the output of the terminal
which does not provide CSIT.
The converse in the regime K ≤ N shows that the sum s.d.o.f. cannot exceed 1
2
(2N −K)
for the MAC-WT channel. Note that a converse for the MAC-WT channel is valid for the
WTH as well. Further, together with the achievable scheme, it shows that the optimal
s.d.o.f. for both the WTH and the MAC-WT channel in this regime is 1
2
(2N −K); therefore,
as in the SISO case [6, 7], which is a subset of this regime with N = K = 1, the MAC-WT
channel reduces to the WTH when the eavesdropper’s CSIT is not available. Recalling that
with full eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MAC-WT channel in this regime
is min(N, 2
3
(2N −K)) [8,9], this also illustrates the loss of s.d.o.f. for the MAC-WT channel
due to the lack of eavesdropper’s CSIT.
Next, we consider the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . In this regime, we provide an upper
bound which shows that the sum s.d.o.f. of the MAC-WT channel cannot be larger than
min
(
N
2
, 2N(2N−K)
4N−K
)
. Noting that 2N(2N−K)
4N−K < (2N −K), we conclude that there will be loss
of s.d.o.f. due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, even for the WTH, in the regime 4N
3
≤ K ≤ 2N ,
where min
(
N
2
, 2N −K) s.d.o.f. is achievable with full eavesdropper CSIT [10,11].
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In order to further investigate the optimality of 1
2
(2N − K) as the sum s.d.o.f. for the
MAC-WT channel in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we then restrict ourselves to linear encoding
strategies [12,13], where the channel input of each antenna in every time slot is restricted to
be a linear combination of some information symbols intended for the legitimate receiver and
some artificial noise symbols to provide secrecy at the eavesdropper. We show that under this
restriction to linear encoding schemes, the linear sum s.d.o.f. can be no larger than 1
2
(2N −
K). The key idea of the proof is that since no alignment is possible at the eavesdropper, the
artificial noise symbols should asymptotically occupy the maximum number of dimensions
available at the eavesdropper; consequently, the dimension of the linear signal space at the
eavesdropper should be Kn+ o(n) in n channel uses.
Related Work: The MAC-WT channel is introduced by [14, 15], where the technique of
cooperative jamming is introduced to improve the rates achievable with Gaussian signaling.
Reference [16] provides outer bounds and identifies cases where these outer bounds are
within 0.5 bits per channel use of the rates achievable by Gaussian signaling. While the
exact secrecy capacity remains unknown, the achievable rates in [14–16] all yield zero s.d.o.f.
Positive s.d.o.f. can be obtained by either structured signaling [17] or non-i.i.d. Gaussian
signaling [18]. The exact optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with M helpers and the
K-user MAC-WT channel are established to be M
M+1
and K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 , respectively in [2], when
full eavesdropper’s CSIT is available. References [6, 7, 19] show that without eavesdropper’s
CSIT, the optimal s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with M helpers is still M
M+1
, while the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the K-user MAC-WT channel decreases to K−1
K
. The two-user MIMO
WTH, with full eavesdropper CSIT is considered in [10, 11, 20], and the optimal s.d.o.f. is
determined for the case when the transmitter and the receiver each has N antennas, the
helper has K antennas and the eavesdropper has M antennas. References [8,9,21] determine
the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the two user MIMO MAC-WT channel when each transmitter and
the receiver have N antennas while the eavesdropper has K antennas, and full eavesdropper
CSIT is available.
A related line of research investigates the MIMO wiretap channel, the MIMO MAC-WT,
and the MIMO broadcast channel with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper [22–24], when the
eavesdropper CSIT is not available. The eavesdropper’s channel is assumed to be arbitrary,
without any assumptions on its distribution, and security is guaranteed for every realization
of the eavesdropper’s channel. This models an exceptionally strong eavesdropper, which
may control its own channel in an adversarial manner. When K ≥ N , the eavesdropper’s
channel realizations may be exactly equal to the legitimate user’s channel realizations, and
therefore, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is zero in this regime for both the MAC-WT and the
WTH. When K ≤ N , and the channel matrices to the legitimate receiver are full rank, the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N − K for both the MAC-WT and the WTH. On the other hand,
in our model, the entries in the eavesdropper’s channel matrices are drawn from a known
distribution, though the realizations are not known at the transmitters. We show that, with
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Figure 1: Wiretap channel with a helper (WTH).
this mild assumption, strictly positive s.d.o.f. can be achieved even when K ≥ N . Further,
the s.d.o.f. achieved in our case when K ≤ N is strictly larger than the optimal s.d.o.f. of
N −K for the case with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper.
2 System Model
In this paper, we consider two fundamental channel models: the MIMO WTH and the
MIMO MAC-WT. In each case, we assume that the channel gains are non-zero and are
drawn from a common continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion in
each channel use. The common continuous distribution is known at all the terminals in the
system. We assume no eavesdropper CSIT, that is, the channel gains to the eavesdropper
are not available at any transmitter. In the following three subsections we describe each
channel model and provide the relevant definitions.
2.1 Wiretap Channel with a Helper
The MIMO WTH, see Fig. 1, is described by,
Y(t) =H1(t)X1(t) + H2(t)X2(t) + N1(t) (1)
Z(t) =G1(t)X1(t) + G2(t)X2(t) + N2(t) (2)
where X1(t) and X2(t) are N dimensional column vectors denoting the input of the legiti-
mate transmitter and the helper, respectively, Y(t) is an N dimensional vector denoting the
legitimate receiver’s channel output, and Z(t) is a K dimensional vector denoting the eaves-
dropper’s channel output, at time t. In addition, N1(t) and N2(t) are N and K dimensional
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Figure 2: Multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT).
white Gaussian noise vectors, respectively, with N1 ∼ N (0, IN) and N2 ∼ N (0, IK), where
IN denotes the N×N identity matrix. Here, Hi(t) and Gi(t) are the N×N and K×N chan-
nel matrices from transmitter i to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively,
at time t. The entries of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from a fixed continuous distribution with
bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion at every time slot t. We assume that the channel matri-
ces at the legitimate receiver, Hi(t), are known with full precision at all terminals, at time t.
However, the channel matrices to the eavesdropper, Gi(t) are not known at any transmitter.
All channel inputs satisfy the average power constraint E[‖Xi(t)‖2] ≤ P, i = 1, 2, where
‖X‖ denotes the Euclidean (or spectral) norm of the vector (or matrix) X.
The transmitter wishes to send a message W , uniformly distributed in W , securely to
the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. A secure rate R, with R = log |W|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at
the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[W 6= Wˆ ] ≤ n, for i = 1, 2, and the secrecy constraint,
namely,
1
n
I(W ;Zn) ≤ n (3)
where n → 0 as n→∞. An s.d.o.f. d is said to be achievable if a rate R is achievable with
d = lim
P→∞
R
1
2
logP
(4)
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2.2 Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
The two-user MIMO MAC-WT, see Fig. 2, is as follows:
Y(t) =H1(t)X1(t) + H2(t)X2(t) + N1(t) (5)
Z(t) =G1(t)X1(t) + G2(t)X2(t) + N2(t) (6)
where Xi(t) is an N dimensional column vector denoting the ith user’s channel input, Y(t)
is an N dimensional vector denoting the legitimate receiver’s channel output, and Z(t) is a
K dimensional vector denoting the eavesdropper’s channel output, at time t. In addition,
N1(t) and N2(t) are N and K dimensional white Gaussian noise vectors, respectively, with
N1 ∼ N (0, IN) and N2 ∼ N (0, IK), where IN denotes the N × N identity matrix. Here,
Hi(t) and Gi(t) are the N × N and K × N channel matrices from transmitter i to the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time t. The entries of Hi(t) and
Gi(t) are drawn from a fixed continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion
at every time slot t. We assume that the channel matrices to the legitimate receiver, Hi(t),
are known with full precision at all terminals, at time t. However, the channel matrices to
the eavesdropper, Gi(t), are not available at the transmitters. All channel inputs satisfy the
average power constraint E[‖Xi(t)‖2] ≤ P, i = 1, 2.
Transmitter i wishes to send a message Wi, uniformly distributed in Wi, securely to
the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. A secure rate pair (R1, R2),
with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability
constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[Wi 6= Wˆi] ≤ n, for i = 1, 2, and the secrecy
constraint, namely,
1
n
I(W1,W2;Z
n) ≤ n (7)
where n → 0 as n → ∞. An s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) is said to be achievable if a rate pair
(R1, R2) is achievable with
di = lim
P→∞
Ri
1
2
logP
(8)
The sum s.d.o.f. ds is the largest achievable d1 + d2.
2.3 A Linear Secure Degrees of Freedom Perspective
In this paper, we also consider linear coding strategies as defined in [12, 25]. In such cases,
the degrees of freedom simply represents the dimension of the linear subspace of transmitted
signals.
When we focus on linear coding schemes, we consider a communication scheme of block-
length n, where transmitter i wishes to send mi(n) information symbols vi ∈ Rmi(n) to the
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legitimate receiver reliably and securely. In case of the WTH, m2(n) = 0. Each information
symbol is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance αP , where α is a constant
chosen to ensure that the power constraints are satisfied at each transmitter. In addition
to the information symbols, transmitter i can use ni(n) artificial noise symbols, ui ∈ Rni(n)
each of which is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance αP . These artificial
noise symbols need not be decoded at the receiver; instead they drown out the information
symbols at the eavesdropper for security.
At each time t, the information symbols vi at transmitter i are modulated by a pre-
coding matrix Pi(t) ∈ RN×mi(n), while the artificial noise symbols ui are modulated using
a precoding matrix Qi(t) ∈ RN×ni(n). Since the channel gains Hi(t), i = 1, 2 are known
at both transmitters at time t, the precoding matrices Pi(t) and Qi(t) can each depend on
{H1(k),H2(k), k = 1, . . . , t}. However, since the channel gains Gi(t) are not available at any
transmitter, Pi and Qi are independent of {Gi(t), t = 1, . . . , n}.
At time t, transmitter i sends a linear combination of the information and the artificial
noise symbols:
Xi(t) = Pi(t)vi + Qi(t)ui (9)
The channel outputs at time t are, therefore,
Y(t) =H1(t)P1(t)v1 + H2(t)P2(t)v2 + H1(t)Q1(t)u1 + H2(t)Q2(t)u2 + N1(t) (10)
Z(t) =G1(t)P1(t)v1 + G2(t)P2(t)v2 + G1(t)Q1(t)u1 + G2(t)Q2(t)u2 + N2(t) (11)
Now letting P¯i = [Pi(1), . . . ,Pi(n)]
T , Q¯i = [Qi(1), . . . ,Qi(n)], we can compactly write the
channel outputs as
Y¯ = H¯1P¯1v1 + H¯2P¯2v2 + H¯1Q¯1u1 + H¯2Q¯2u2 + N¯1 (12)
Z¯ = G¯1P¯1v1 + G¯2P¯2v2 + G¯1Q¯1u1 + G¯2Q¯2u2 + N¯2 (13)
where H¯i and G¯i are the Nn×Nn and Kn×Nn block diagonal matrices
H¯i =

Hi(1) 0 . . . 0
0 Hi(2) . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Hi(n)
 , G¯i =

Gi(1) 0 . . . 0
0 Gi(2) . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Gi(n)
 (14)
and N¯i = [Ni(1), . . . ,Ni(n)]
T for i = 1, 2.
At the legitimate receiver, the interference subspace is
IB = colspan([H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]) (15)
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Let IcB denote the orthogonal subspace of IB. If we ignore the additive Gaussian noise, i.e.,
in the high transmit power regime, the decodability of v1 and v2 at the legitimate receiver
corresponds to the constraint that the projection of the subspace colspan([H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2])
onto IcB must have dimension m1(n) +m2(n), i.e.,
dim
(
ProjIcBcolspan
(
[H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2]
))
= dim
(
colspan
(
[P¯1]
))
+ dim
(
colspan
(
[P¯2]
))
= m1(n) +m2(n) (16)
This can be rewritten as requiring that
rank
(
[H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]
)− rank ([H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]) = m1(n) +m2(n) (17)
On the other hand, at the eavesdropper, we require that
lim
n→∞
1
n
dim
(
ProjIcEcolspan
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2]
))
= 0, a.s. (18)
where IE = colspan([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]).
The security requirement in (18) can be reformulated as follows: Let L(n) be the number
of leakage dimensions defined as
L(n) =rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)− rank ([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]) (19)
Then, we want
lim
n→∞
L(n)
n
= 0, a.s. (20)
In other words, we want the artificial noise symbols to occupy the full received signal space
at the eavesdropper asymptotically.
The quantity L(n) may be thought of as the evaluation of limP→∞
I(v1,v2;Z¯)
1
2
logP
for the input-
output relation stated in (13). To see this, we use [7, Lemma 1], which we state here for
completeness.
Lemma 1 Let A be an M ×N dimensional matrix and let X = (X1, . . . , XN)T be a jointly
Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance P I. Also, let N = (N1, . . . , NM)
T be
a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance σ2I, independent of X. If
r = rank(A), then,
h(AX + N) = r
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (21)
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Using Lemma 1, we have
I(v1,v2; Z¯) =h(Z¯)− h(Z¯|v1,v2) (22)
=
(
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)− rank ([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]))(1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (23)
=L(n)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (24)
which implies
lim
P→∞
I(v1,v2; Z¯)
1
2
logP
= L(n) (25)
In a similar way, the decodability requirement in (17) can be thought of as ensuring that
limP→∞
I(v1,v2;Y¯)
1
2
logP
= m1(n) +m2(n), for the input output relation stated in (12).
For the WTH, a linear s.d.o.f. dlin with dlin = m1(n)/n is said to be achievable if there
exists a sequence of precoding matrices P¯1, Q¯1, Q¯2 such that both the reliability constraints
in (16) and the security constraints in (18) are satisfied.
For the MAC-WT channel, a linear s.d.o.f. pair (dlin1 , d
lin
2 ), with d
lin
i = mi(n)/n is said
to be achievable if there exists a sequence of precoding matrices P¯i, Q¯i such that both the
reliability constraints in (16) and the security constraints in (18) are satisfied. The linear
sum s.d.o.f. dlins is the supremum of d
lin
1 + d
lin
2 , such that the pair (d
lin
1 , d
lin
2 ) is achievable.
3 Main Results
The main result of this paper is the determination of the optimal linear sum s.d.o.f. for the
MIMO WTH and the MIMO MAC-WT channel. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For both the N ×N ×N ×K WTH and the MAC-WT channel with no eaves-
dropper CSIT, the optimal linear sum s.d.o.f. dlins is
dlins = max
(
1
2
(2N −K), 0
)
(26)
for almost all channel gains. Further, without any linearity constraints, the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. ds is
ds

= 1
2
(2N −K), 0 ≤ K ≤ N
≤ min
(
N
2
, 2N(2N−K)
4N−K
)
, N ≤ K ≤ 2N
= 0, K ≥ 2N
(27)
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Figure 3: Sum s.d.o.f. with number of eavesdropper antennas.
We also have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For the N × N × N ×K MAC-WT channel with no eavesdropper CSIT, the
linear s.d.o.f. region is given by the set of all nonnegative pairs (dlin1 , d
lin
2 ) that satisfy,
dlin1 + d
lin
2 =
1
2
(2N −K) (28)
The proof of the corollary follows from the observation that every point in the given region
can be achieved by time sharing between the points
(
1
2
(2N −K), 0) and (0, 1
2
(2N −K)),
which can themselves be attained by treating the MAC-WT channel as a WTH. Also, no
point outside the region is achievable since the sum s.d.o.f. is bounded by 1
2
(2N −K) from
Theorem 1.
Fig. 3 shows the optimal linear sum s.d.o.f. for the WTH and the MAC-WT channel
with and without eavesdropper CSIT, while Fig. 4 shows the general (without any linearity
restrictions on the encoding schemes) upper bound on the sum s.d.o.f. for the MAC-WT
channel without eavesdropper CSIT. Similar to the SISO case [7], as shown in Fig. 3, the
MIMO MAC-WT channel reduces to the WTH when the eavesdropper CSIT is not available
for the regime 0 ≤ K ≤ N , and at least from a linear s.d.o.f. perspective in the regime
N ≤ K ≤ 2N . However, unlike in the SISO case [7], the linear s.d.o.f. for the WTH
decreases due to the lack of eavesdropper CSIT. Even without any linearity constraints, the
optimal s.d.o.f. for the WTH does decrease due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, as can be seen
from the general upper bound in Fig. 4, especially in the regime 4N
3
≤ K ≤ 2N . Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4 also show the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the WTH and the MAC-WT with an arbitrarily
varying eavesdropper. When K ≥ N , the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is zero in this case since
with K = N , the channel matrices of eavesdropper channel may be made exactly equal to
10
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Figure 4: Converse for MAC-WT with no Eve CSIT.
the channel matrices of the legitimate receiver’s channel. When K ≤ N and the legitimate
receiver’s channel matrices are full rank, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N − K for both the
MAC-WT and the WTH. Thus, we achieve a strictly larger sum s.d.o.f. in our case where
the entries of the eavesdropper’s channel matrices are drawn from a continuous distribution
and security is guaranteed on average, and not for every realization.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 by providing an achievable scheme and a converse.
Since Theorem 1 implies that the WTH and the MAC-WT channel have the same linear
sum s.d.o.f., we first note that it suffices to provide a linear achievable scheme for the WTH,
since the MAC-WT channel can be treated as a WTH with time sharing between the users.
Also, since any rate achievable for the WTH is achievable for the MAC-WT channel, a
converse for the MAC-WT channel suffices as a converse for the WTH as well. Thus, in the
following subsections, we provide an achievable scheme for the WTH and a converse for the
MAC-WT channel.
4.1 Achievable Scheme for the WTH
In this section, we provide an achievable scheme for the WTH. In this scheme, the transmitter
sends (2N −K) information symbols reliably and securely to the legitimate receiver in two
time slots, in order to achieve 1
2
(2N −K) s.d.o.f. At each time slot, transmitter 1 sends a
linear combination of (2N −K) information symbols v1 and K artificial noise symbols u1 as
in (9). Transmitter 2 sends a linear combination of its K artificial noise symbols u2. Since
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transmitter 2 does not have any information symbols v2 for the WTH, there is no P2 in that
case. The channel outputs can be written compactly as in (12)-(13) as:
Y¯ = H¯1P¯1v1 + H¯1Q¯1u1 + H¯2Q¯2u2 + N¯1 (29)
Z¯ = G¯1P¯1v1 + G¯1Q¯1u1 + G¯2Q¯2u2 + N¯2 (30)
where
H¯i =
[
Hi(1) 0
0 Hi(2)
]
, G¯i =
[
Gi(1) 0
0 Gi(2)
]
(31)
It remains to choose the precoding matrices P¯1, Q¯1 and Q¯2 appropriately. We make the
following selection:
Q¯i = H¯
−1
i Q¯, i = 1, 2 (32)
where Q¯ is a 2N ×K matrix with rank K. Also choose P¯1 to be a 2N × (2N −K) matrix
with rank 2N −K, such that the matrix [H¯1P¯1, Q¯] has rank 2N . Note that this condition
will be satisfied almost surely if the elements of P¯1 and Q¯ are chosen from any continuous
distribution in an i.i.d. fashion. With this selection, the channel outputs are:
Y¯ =H¯1P¯1v1 + Q¯1(u1 + u2) + N¯1 (33)
Z¯ =G¯1P¯1v1 + G¯1H¯
−1
1 Q¯u1 + G¯2H¯
−1
2 Q¯u2 + N¯2 (34)
The decodability of v1 at the legitimate receiver in the high transmit power regime follows
immediately since the matrix [H¯1P¯1, Q¯] has rank 2N by our choice of P¯1 and Q¯. On the
other hand, the number of leakage dimensions L is
L =rank[G¯1P¯1, G¯1H¯
−1
1 Q¯, G¯2H¯
−1
2 Q¯]− rank[G¯1H¯−11 Q¯, G¯2H¯−12 Q¯] (35)
≤2K − 2K (36)
=0 (37)
where we have used the fact that for any full-rank Q¯ chosen independently of G¯1, G¯2, we
have that rank[G¯1H¯
−1
1 Q¯, G¯2H¯
−1
2 Q¯] = 2K for almost all channel realizations of (G¯1, G¯2).
This follows from the following lemma by noting that each row and each column of G¯i has
at least one entry drawn from a continuous distribution in an i.i.d. fashion and the matrices
H¯−1i Q¯ for i = 1, 2 do not depend on the G¯is.
Lemma 2 Let P1 ∈ RN×m1 and P2 ∈ RN×m2 fixed matrices with ranks p1 and p2, respec-
tively. Let G1 and G2 be K ×N matrices whose each row and each column has at least one
entry that is drawn from some continuous distribution in an i.i.d. fashion, and the remaining
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elements are arbitrary but fixed. Then, almost surely,
rank[G1P1,G2P2] = min (p1 + p2, K) (38)
The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix A.
Therefore, the security requirement in (20) is satisfied as well. This completes the
achievable scheme. We remark here that using Lemma 1, it can be easily shown that
I(v1; Y¯) = (2N − K)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) and I(v1; Z¯) ≤ o(logP ). An achievable rate
for the wiretap channel over two channel uses, Rvec is given by [26]
Rvec =I(v1; Y¯)− I(v1; Z¯) (39)
≥(2N −K)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (40)
Therefore, the effective achievable secure rate is
R ≥ (2N −K)
2
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (41)
which yields an s.d.o.f. of 1
2
(2N −K).
4.2 Converse
In this section, we prove the converse for the MAC-WT channel. To that end, we consider
two regimes of K. When 0 ≤ K ≤ N , we prove the converse for general transmission schemes
without any restrictions of linearity. For the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we prove the converse
under the assumption of linear coding schemes only. We also provide a general upper bound
in this regime which does not match the achievablity; nevertheless, it shows that there is
loss in s.d.o.f. for the WTH and the MAC-WT channel due to no eavesdropper CSIT.
4.2.1 0 ≤ K ≤ N : Converse with No Restrictions
We wish to show that:
d1 + d2 ≤ 1
2
(2N −K) (42)
Let us first state three lemmas which are useful for the proof.
Lemma 3 (Channel symmetry [3, Lemma 3]) Let ZK = {Z1, . . . , ZK} be entropy sym-
metric, i.e., for any subsets A and B of {1, . . . , K}, with |A| = |B| ≤ K,
h({Zi, i ∈ A}) = h({Zi, i ∈ B}) (43)
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Then, for any M ≥ N , the following holds:
1
N
h(ZN) ≥ 1
M
h(ZM) (44)
Lemma 4 (Least alignment lemma [5, Lemma 3]) Consider two receivers, each with
L antennas. Suppose the channel gains to receiver 2 are not available at the transmitters. If
Y and Z denote the channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2, respectively, we have
h(Zn) ≥ h(Yn) + no(logP ) (45)
Combining the two lemmas, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For the N ×N ×N ×K MIMO MAC-WT channel with no eavesdropper CSIT,
with K ≤ N
h(Zn) ≥ K
N
h(Yn) + no(logP ) (46)
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix B.
Let us now proceed with the converse proof. As in [2, 8, 10, 11], we define noisy versions
of Xi as X˜i = Xi + N˜i where N˜i ∼ N (0, ρ2i IN) with ρ2i < min
(
1
‖Hi‖2 ,
1
‖Gi‖2
)
. The secrecy
penalty lemma [2] can then be derived as
n(R1 +R2) ≤I(W1,W2;Yn|Zn) + n (47)
≤h(Yn|Zn) + no(logP ) (48)
=h(Yn,Zn)− h(Zn) + no(logP ) (49)
≤h(X˜n1 , X˜n2 )− h(Zn) + no(logP ) (50)
=h(X˜n1 ) + h(X˜
n
2 )− h(Zn) + no(logP ) (51)
The role of a helper lemma [2] also generalizes to the MIMO case as
nR1 ≤I(Xn1 ;Yn) (52)
=h(Yn)− h(Hn2Xn2 + Nn1 ) (53)
≤h(Yn)− h(X˜n2 ) + no(logP ) (54)
By symmetry, we also have
nR2 ≤h(Yn)− h(X˜n1 ) + no(logP ) (55)
Adding (51), (54) and (55), we have
2n(R1 +R2) ≤2h(Yn)− h(Zn) + no(logP ) (56)
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≤2h(Yn)− K
N
h(Yn) + no(logP ) (57)
=
2N −K
N
h(Yn) + no(logP ) (58)
≤(2N −K)
(n
2
logP
)
+ no(logP ) (59)
where (57) follows from Lemma 5 and we have used the fact that h(Yn) ≤ N
2
logP +
no(logP ). Therefore, we have,
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
2
(2N −K)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (60)
Dividing by 1
2
logP and taking the limit P →∞, we have
d1 + d2 ≤ 1
2
(2N −K) (61)
which completes the proof of the converse for the regime 0 ≤ K ≤ N .
4.2.2 N ≤ K ≤ 2N : Converse with Linear Coding Strategies
We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 6 For the N×N×N×K MAC-WT channel, and for any linear achievable scheme
satisfying both the reliability and security constraints, and also d1 + d2 > 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
= K (62)
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix C.
To proceed with the upper bound, first note that since strictly positive sum s.d.o.f. is
achievable for the MAC-WT channel using linear schemes, we can safely discard the case
d1 +d2 = 0 for the purpose of the converse. Therefore, from Lemma 6, the rank of the vector
space spanned by the output at the eavesdropper is Kn+ o(n), i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
= K (63)
We have,
m1(n) +m2(n) =rank
(
[H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]
)− rank ([H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]) (64)
≤rank ([H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2])− rank ([H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2])
− rank ([G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2])+ rank ([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2])+ o(n)
(65)
≤rank ([H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2])− 1
2
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
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− rank ([G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2])+ rank ([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2])+ o(n)
(66)
=rank
(
[H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]
)
+
1
2
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
− rank ([G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2])+ o(n) (67)
≤rank ([H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2])+ 1
2
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
− rank ([G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2])+ o(n) (68)
≤rank ([H¯1P¯1, H¯2P¯2, H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2])+ o(n)
− 1
2
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
(69)
≤Nn− 1
2
Kn+ o(n) (70)
=
(2N −K)n
2
+ o(n) (71)
where (64) follows from the decodability constraint, (65) follows from the secrecy constraint
(20), and (66) follows from the following:
2× rank ([H¯1Q¯1, H¯2Q¯2]) ≥ rank ([H¯1Q¯1])+ rank ([H¯2Q¯2]) (72)
= rank
(
[Q¯1]
)
+ rank
(
[Q¯2]
)
(73)
= rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1]
)
+ rank
(
[G¯2Q¯2]
)
(74)
≥ rank ([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]) (75)
The above equalities all hold almost surely since H¯i and G¯i are both full column rank almost
surely. Finally, (70) follows from Lemma 6.
Now dividing by n and taking limit n→∞, we have
d1 + d2 ≤ 1
2
(2N −K) (76)
4.2.3 N ≤ K ≤ 2N : Converse with No Restrictions
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 For the N ×N ×N ×K MIMO MAC-WT channel with no eavesdropper CSIT,
with K ≤ 2N
h(Zn) ≥ K
2N
h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (77)
The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix D.
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Now we proceed as in the case of 0 ≤ K ≤ N with the secrecy penalty lemma [2]:
n(R1 +R2) ≤I(W1,W2;Yn|Zn) + n (78)
≤h(Yn|Zn) + no(logP ) (79)
≤h(Yn,Zn)− h(Zn) + no(logP ) (80)
≤
(
1− K
2N
)
h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (81)
≤
(
1− K
2N
)
h(X˜n1 , X˜
n
2 ) + no(logP ) (82)
=
2N −K
2N
(
h(X˜n1 ) + h(X˜
n
2 )
)
+ no(logP ) (83)
The role of the helper lemma [2] yields, for i 6= j:
nRi ≤h(Yn)− h(X˜nj ) + no(logP ) (84)
Eliminating h(X˜n1 ) and h(X˜
n
2 ) using (83) and (84),
n(R1 +R2) ≤2(2N −K)
4N −K h(Y
n) + no(logP ) (85)
≤2N(2N −K)
4N −K
(n
2
logP
)
+ no(logP ) (86)
Dividing by n and letting n→∞, we have
R1 +R2 ≤ 2N(2N −K)
4N −K
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (87)
Now dividing by 1
2
logP and letting P →∞,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2N(2N −K)
4N −K (88)
Also, d1 + d2 ≤ N2 , since N2 is the optimal sum s.d.o.f. when K = N , and the sum s.d.o.f. is
non-increasing in K.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered two fundamental multi-user channel models: the MIMO WTH
and the MIMO MAC-WT channel. In each case, the eavesdropper has K antennas while
the remaining terminals have N antennas. We assumed that the CSIT of the legitimate
receiver is available but no eavesdropper CSIT is available. We determined the optimal
sum s.d.o.f. for each channel model for the regime K ≤ N , and showed that in this regime,
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the MAC-WT channel reduces to the WTH in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT. For the
regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we obtained the optimal linear s.d.o.f., and showed that the MAC-
WT channel and the WTH have the same optimal s.d.o.f. when restricted to linear encoding
strategies. In the absence of any such restrictions, we provided an upper bound for the sum
s.d.o.f. of the MAC-WT channel in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . Our results showed that unlike
in the SISO case, there is loss of s.d.o.f. for even the WTH due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT,
especially when K ≥ N .
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 2
First note when N ≤ K, Gis have full column rank almost surely. Therefore,
rank[GiPi] = rank[Pi] = pi (89)
almost surely. On the other hand, when N ≥ K, we have
rank[GiPi] ≥ rank[GiPˆi] (90)
where Pˆi is a N × pi submatrix of Pi with full column rank. Let p¯i = min(K, pi). Now, the
determinant of any p¯i × p¯i submatrix of GiPˆi is a multi-variate polynomial of the random
entries of Gi and is zero for only finitely many realizations. Therefore, GiPˆi has rank p¯i.
Note that when N ≤ K, p¯i = pi is satisfied trivially.
Therefore, there exists a set Ii ⊆ {1, . . . ,mi} such that |Ii| = p¯i and the collection of
column vectors Ci = {cij, j ∈ Ii} are linearly independent, where cij denotes the jth column
of GiPi. Clearly,
rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≥ rank[C1,C2] (91)
The matrix [C1,C2] is a K × (p¯1 + p¯2) matrix. Now, if K ≤ p¯1 + p¯2, consider any K ×K
submatrix of [C1,C2]. The determinant of this submatrix is a multi-variate polynomial
function of the random entries of G1 and G2, and therefore, the determinant can be zero for
only finitely many realizations, corresponding to the roots of the multi-variate polynomial
function. Note that this is true if each row and each column of G¯i has at least one random
entry. Also, the polynomial function is not identically zero. Therefore,
rank[C1,C2] = K (92)
On the other hand, if K ≥ p¯1 + p¯2, we can consider a (p¯1 + p¯2)× (p¯1 + p¯2) submatrix of
[C1,C2], and using a similar argument, we can claim that
rank[C1,C2] = p¯1 + p¯2 (93)
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Combining (91), (92) and (93), we have
rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≥min (p¯1 + p¯2, K) (94)
= min (min(p1, K) + min(p2, K), K) (95)
= min (min(p1 + p2, K + p1, K + p2, 2K), K) (96)
= min (p1 + p2, K) (97)
On the other hand,
rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≤rank[G1P1] + rank[G2P2] (98)
≤min(rank[G1], p1) + min(rank[G2], p2) (99)
= min(N,K, p1) + min(N,K, p2) (100)
= min(K, p1) + min(K, p2) (101)
where (99) follows since rank[AB] ≤ min(rank[A], rank[B]), (100) follows since Gi is full
rank almost surely, and (101) follows since N ≥ pi. Finally, it trivially holds that K ≥
rank[G1P1,G2P2]. Therefore, we have,
rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≤min(K,min(K, p1) + min(K, p2)) (102)
= min(K, p1 + p2) (103)
Combining (97) and (103) completes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 5
Note that K ≤ N . Consider N −K additional outputs Zˆ at the eavesdropper as:
Zˆ(t) = Gˆ1(t)X1(t) + Gˆ2(t)X2(t) + Nˆ2(t) (104)
where each Gˆi is a (N −K)×N matrix whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from the
same continuous distribution as the entries of Gi, and the entries of Nˆ2 are i.i.d. zero-mean
unit-variance Gaussian noise. Assume that the Gˆis are unavailable at the transmitters.. The
enhanced output Z¯(t) = (Z(t), Zˆ(t)) is clearly entropy symmetric. Using Lemma 3, we have
h(Zn) ≥ K
N
h(Z¯n) (105)
Now, since the Gis and Gˆis are not available at the transmitters, using Lemma 4, we have
h(Z¯n) ≥ h(Yn) + no(logP ) (106)
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Combining (105) and (106), we get the desired result that
h(Zn) ≥ K
N
h(Yn) + no(logP ) (107)
Appendix C Proof of Lemma 6
Since d1 + d2 > 0, without loss of generality, assume d1 > 0. We wish to prove that
lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
= K (108)
For the sake of contradiction, suppose limn→∞ 1nrank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
< K. We have
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
) ≥ rank ([G¯1P¯1, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]) (109)
= rank
(
[G¯1[P¯1, Q¯1], G¯2Q¯2]
)
(110)
≥ min (rank ([P¯1, Q¯1])+ rank ([Q¯2]) , Kn) (111)
= min
(
rank
(
[P¯1]
)
+ rank
(
[Q¯1]
)
+ rank
(
[Q¯2]
)
, Kn
)
(112)
= min
(
m1(n) + rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1]
)
+ rank
(
[G¯2Q¯2]
)
, Kn
)
(113)
≥ min (m1(n) + rank ([G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]) , Kn) (114)
where (111) follows from Lemma 2, (112) follows from the decodability requirement, and
(113) follows almost surely since G¯i is full column rank almost surely as long as K > N .
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1P¯1, G¯2P¯2, G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
) ≥ min(d1 + lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
, K
)
(115)
> lim
n→∞
1
n
rank
(
[G¯1Q¯1, G¯2Q¯2]
)
(116)
which contradicts the security requirement in (20).
Appendix D Proof of Lemma 7
Consider 2N −K additional outputs Zˆ at the eavesdropper:
Zˆ(t) = Gˆ1(t)X1(t) + Gˆ2(t)X2(t) + Nˆ2(t) (117)
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where each Gˆi is a (2N−K)×N matrix whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from the
same continuous distribution as the entries of Gi, and the entries of Nˆ2 are i.i.d. zero-mean
unit-variance Gaussian noise. Assume that the Gˆis are not available at the transmitters ei-
ther. Then, the enhanced output Z¯(t) = (Z(t), Zˆ(t)) is clearly entropy symmetric. Therefore,
using Lemma 3, we have
h(Zn) ≥ K
2N
h(Z¯n) (118)
Now, given Z¯n, we can decode both inputs Xn1 and X
n
2 to within noise variance, and therefore,
also Yn and Zn. Thus, we have
h(Z¯n) ≥ h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (119)
Combining (118) and (119), we get the desired result that
h(Zn) ≥ K
2N
h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (120)
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